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Abstract
Batch Normalization (BatchNorm) is effective for
improving the performance and accelerating the
training of deep neural networks. However, it has
also shown to be a cause of adversarial vulnera-
bility, i.e., networks without it are more robust
to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we inves-
tigate how BatchNorm causes this vulnerability
and proposed new normalization that is robust
to adversarial attacks. We first observe that ad-
versarial images tend to shift the distribution of
BatchNorm input, and this shift makes train-time
estimated population statistics inaccurate. We
hypothesize that these inaccurate statistics make
models with BatchNorm more vulnerable to ad-
versarial attacks. We prove our hypothesis by re-
placing train-time estimated statistics with statis-
tics calculated from the inference-time batch. We
found that the adversarial vulnerability of Batch-
Norm disappears if we use these statistics. How-
ever, without estimated batch statistics, we can
not use BatchNorm in the practice if large batches
of input are not available. To mitigate this, we
propose Robust Normalization (RobustNorm); an
adversarially robust version of BatchNorm. We
experimentally show that models trained with Ro-
bustNorm perform better in adversarial settings
while retaining all the benefits of BatchNorm.
Code is available at https://github.com/
awaisrauf/RobustNorm.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have shown impressive performance
for image classification tasks. However, they are highly
vulnerable to adversarial inputs; addition of small but tar-
geted noise – imperceptible to humans but make networks
misclassify with high confidence (Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Nguyen et al., 2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017). This vulner-
1Kyung-He University, South Korea 2Information Technology
University, Lahore, Pakistan. Correspondence to: Muhammad
Awais <awais@khu.ac.kr>.
Under Review.
ability has severe consequences as these neural networks
are employed in many security-critical applications such as
face recognition, disease detection, and fraud prevention.
Understanding the adversarial phenomenon is of high inter-
est and many explanations such as blind spots in learned
class boundaries, local linear nature of networks, and shift
in input distribution have been presented (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Ding et al., 2019; Ilyas et al.,
2019). Similarly, many defense mechanisms to prevent this
vulerability have also emerged. There are two different
types of defense mechanisms: adding adversarial examples
for training also called adversarial training (Madry et al.,
2017; Trame`r et al., 2017) and improving the architecture
of neural networks (Papernot et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2019b).
While there exist a plethora of reasons for the adversarial
behavior of neural networks (Jacobsen et al., 2018; Simon-
Gabriel et al., 2018; Yuan et al., 2019; Ilyas et al., 2019;
Geirhos et al., 2018), a recent study by Galloway et al. 2019
has shown that BatchNorm is one of them. They have em-
pirically shown that we can enhance the robustness of neu-
ral networks against adversarial perturbations by removing
BatchNorm. We first investigated how BatchNorm makes
neural networks more vulnerable to adversarial attacks and
provided a fresh perspective. Secondly, we propose a new
normalization which is more robust than BatchNorm while
also keeps the benefits of BatchNorm.
BatchNorm estimates population statistics (mean and vari-
ance) during training and uses them for inference. We hy-
pothesize that the distribution shift in adversarial inputs
makes these statistics inaccurate as they are estimated from
clean images. To test our hypothesis, we replaced these train-
time estimated statistics with current input batch statistics
and showed improvement in adversarial robustness. How-
ever, we can not use this as a remedy since BatchNorm
requires large batch size to calculate these statistics reliably
(which may not be available at test time). Similarly, if we
remove BatchNorm, we lose many benefits such as higher
learning rate, faster convergence, and significant improve-
ment in the accuracy, etc. (Hoffer et al., 2018). To mitigate
this, we propose a new normalization which is based on our
insights and pervious work on understanding BatchNorm.
This proposed normalization outperforms BatchNorm for
adversarial accuracy on several datasets while keeping other
benefits of it. We call this normalization RobustNorm for
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its robust properties.
2. Related Work
Previous works have provided many explanations to un-
derstand the adversarial vulnerability of neural networks.
Szegedy et al. 2013 linked adversarial vulnerability to blind
spots in the discontinuous classification boundary of the neu-
ral network, Goodfellow et al. 2014 blamed it on the local
linearity of neural networks and showed it by constructing
an attack that leverages this property. Some recent work has
connected it with random noise (Fawzi et al., 2016; Ford
et al., 2019), spurious correlations learned by neural net-
works (Ilyas et al., 2019), insufficient data (Schmidt et al.,
2018) high dimensions of input data (Gilmer et al., 2018;
Fawzi et al., 2018), and distributional shift (Jacobsen et al.,
2018; Ding et al., 2019). Similarly, researchers have also
focused on constructing techniques to fight against these
attacks. We can divide defense techniques into two major
camps: training based defense in which we augment ad-
versarial images with clean images during training (Madry
et al., 2017; Trame`r et al., 2017) and architecture based
defense (Papernot et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2019b) in which
we change architecture base defense in which we change
the network. Our work is related to the second camp.
Recently, (Galloway et al., 2019) empirically showed that
the accelerated training properties and occasionally higher
clean test accuracy of employing BatchNorm in the network
come at the cost of low robustness to adversarial pertur-
bations. They attributed it to the tilting of the decision
boundary. Our work builds on their observation, but we
gave a different perspective for understanding this behavior.
Similarly, we also presented a new normalization to improve
adversarial accuracy. Augmentation of adversarial images
often results in lower clean accuracy. However, (Xie et al.,
2019a) got state of the art results on many classification
datasets because they used different BatchNorm layer for
clean and adversarial images during training. This shows
the effect of the distributional shift introduced by adversarial
examples on BatchNorm’s statistic estimation. Note that,
this work is closely related to our hypothesis.
Since the inception of BatchNorm, many different variants
of it have been proposed and each variant of it solves a
particular problem of original formulation. LayerNorm (Ba
et al., 2016) solves the problem of fix batch size training
making it useful in sequence models, BatchReNorm (Ioffe,
2017) and GroupNorm (Wu & He, 2018) eases the problem
of small-batch training making it functional for tasks like
detection or segmentation and InstanceNorm (Ulyanov et al.,
2016) reduces intra-batch dependency making it applicable
in style transfer. Our work is related to these papers as we
also propose a variant that solves the problem of adversarial
vulnerability in BatchNorm. Our work is also dependent on
some recent work on understanding BatchNorm.
3. Background
We consider a standard classification task for data x ∈ Rn
and corresponding true labels y ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, sampled
from a joint distribution Pclean(x, y). For learning, we
divid this data into training (xt, yt) and validation set
(xv, yv). We denote deep neural network as a function,
Fθ : x 7→ y, where θ denotes trainable parameters of the
DNN. The parameter θ is learned by minimizing a loss func-
tion L(Fθ(xt), yt). We denote clean accuracy of a neural
network as percentage of xv correctly classified by Fθ.
In adversarial settings, the objective of the adversary is
to add small additive perturbation δ ∈ Rn in clean im-
age x: xadv = x + δ. While staisfying following con-
straints: adversarial image follows a pertubation budget  or
‖xadv − x‖p ≤ , xadv looks visually similar to the true
image x, and the trained model generates incorrect label i.e.,
Fθ(xadv) 6= y. In the following sections, we assume that
addition of adversarial examples changes the distribution of
input from Pclean(x, y) to Padv(x, y). We define adversar-
ial accuracy as the percentage of validation examples (xv)
correctly classified by a trained model Fθ under an adver-
sarial attack. We now consider some common methods for
adding adversarial noise.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): Introduced by
(Goodfellow et al., 2014), it exploits locally linear behaviour
of neural network. It aims to generate the adversarial image
xadv as,
xadv = x+  · sign(∇xL(x, y)).
Basic Iterative Method (BIM): Constructed by (Kurakin
et al., 2016), it is a straight forward extension of FGSM.
It applies FGSM multiple times with a small step size α
while cliping it to keep in the constraint budget. It initializes
adversarial example with x0adv = x and then iteratively find
xadv as,
xNadv = Clip{xN−1adv + α · sign(∇xL(xN−1adv , y))}
where N denotes iteration number for iterative attack and
clip function clips all the values between 0 and 1.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): PGD perturbs the
true image x for total number of N steps with smaller step
sizes (Madry et al., 2017). After each step of perturbation,
PGD projects the adversarial example back onto the -ball of
normal image x , if it goes beyond the -ball. Specifically,
xNadv = Π(x
N−1
adv + α · sign(∇xL(xN−1adv , y))),
where Π is the projection operator, α is step size, and xNadv
denotes adversarial example at the N -th step.
Momentum Iterative fast gradient sign Method (MIM).
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MIM (Akhtar & Mian, 2018) improves the convergence of
the PGD algorithm by using the momentum. MIM gener-
ates adversarial examples by using the momentum-based
iterative algorithm. By applying momentum gradient and
providing techniques to escape from the poor local maxi-
mum during the iterations. The momentum gradient g can
be calculated as
gN = d · gN−1 + ∇xL(x
N−1
adv , y)∥∥∥∇xL(xN−1adv , y)∥∥∥
where ∇ shows the gradient function and d is the decay
factor. Initially, xN−1 is the original input and g0 is set to
0. In each iteration, xadv is updated as
xNadv = x
N−1
adv + α · sign(gN+1)
Carlini-Wagner attack (CW): CW is an effective
optimization-based attack model introduced by (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017). It works by definining an auxilary variable
ϑ and minimizes the following objective functions
min
ϑ
‖1
2
(tanh(ϑ) + 1)− x‖+ c · f(1
2
(tanh(ϑ) + 1)),
where 12 (tanh(ϑ) + 1)−x is the perturbation δ, c is a scalar
constant, and f(.) is defined as:
f(xadv) = max(Z(xadv)y−max{Z(xadv)k : k 6= y},−%)).
Here, % is to control the adversarial sample’s confidence and
Zxadv are the logits values for class k.
The empirical risk minimization using only clean images for
training can decrease the robustness performance of DNNs.
A standard approach to achieve the adversarial robustness in
neural networks is adversarial training which involves fitting
a neural network Fθ on adversarially-perturbed samples
(Kurakin et al., 2016; Goodfellow et al., 2014).
We have used PGD based adversarial training as it effective
against many first-order adversaries (Madry et al., 2017)
unlike other methods which overfit on single attack. Ad-
versarial training solves following min-max optimization
problem:
min
θ
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
‖δi‖≤
L(Fθ(xi + δi), yi)
4. How does BatchNorm Cause Adversarial
Vulnerability
In this section, we explain why BatchNorm causes adversar-
ial vulnerability. BatchNorm estimates population statistics
during training by using a moving average. These esti-
mated values are then used during inference to decrease
dependence on inference examples. However, one inherent
assumption of this process is that training and inference data
come from same underlying distribution. Adversarial noise,
on the other hand, introduces a targeted shift in the distribu-
tion of input data making this inherent assumption invalid.
In the following sections, we first explain how BatchNorm
works and then we empirically demonstrate our hypothesis
by various experiments.
4.1. How BatchNorm Works
Here, we briefly explain the working principle of Batch-
Norm layer which is directly realted to our hypothesis. Con-
sider a mini-batch B of size M , containing samples xi for
i = 1, 2, ...,M . BatchNorm normalizes the mini-batch by
calculating the mean µβ and variance σ2β as follows:
µB =
1
M
M∑
i=1
xi ; σB =
√√√√ 1
M
M∑
i=1
(xi − µB)2 + .
(1)
Based on these statistics, normalization is performed. To
further compensate for the possible loss of representational
ability of network, BatchNorm also learns per-channel linear
transformation.
xˆi = γ.
xi − µB
σB
+ β (2)
Where γ and β are trainable parameters that represent scale
and shift, respectively. Network learns these parameters
using the same optimizer - such as stochastic gradient de-
scent - as other weights in the network. For the sake of
simplicity, we will omit this linear transformation in all
future discussions.
Ideally, we want to use statistics computed over all the data
(population statistics) but this is not possible in mini-batch
based optimization. Instead, we use expected value of mean
µP = E(µB) and variance σ2P = E(σ2B) as estimation for in-
ference. The estimate of population statistics are computed
by maintaining the moving averages of these statistics dur-
ing training. Formally, moving average (also called tracking
sometimes) of mean and variance are computed as follows:
µˆP = (1− τ)µˆP + τµβ , σˆ2P = (1− τ)σˆ2P + τσ2B (3)
Here µˆP and µˆP are estimated values of population mean
and variance and τ is a hyper-parameter and weighs previous
moving average and current batch statistics. For inference,
BatchNorm can be represented as,
xˆtest =
xtest − µˆP
σˆP
(4)
4.2. Devil is in the Moving Average
At inference time, BatchNorm layer “corrects” input with
µˆP and σˆP estimated during training. But adversarial attack
introduces a targeted shift in the input. This makes estimated
µˆP and σˆP incorrect. A conceptual depiction of this is
shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. A conceptual illustration of the effect of adversarial dis-
tribution shift on BatchNorm. In the plot, the blue line represents
an ideal distribution that BatchNorm and orange line shows the
inference data distribution. Input distribution is a good approx-
imate of ideal distribution for clean images but the distribution
gets shifted when adversarial noise is added in the input image.
This invalidates the implicit assumption of BatchNorm that the
train and validation data will be from the same distribution. This
makes population statistics estimated during training (with clean
distribution) inaccurate and causes adversarial vulnerability.
Figure 2. The difference between test batch statistics (µB , σ2B)
and estimated population statistics (µˆP and σˆP ) under adversarial
attack. The x-axis represents channels of the network and y-axis
represents batches. Each line shows difference of estimated and
calculated value of distribution statistics for one channel.
To show this difference, we forward propagated all the vali-
dation set samples of CIFAR10 with PGD adversarial noise
added and calculated batch statistics(µB , σ2B) of each chan-
nel of a trained ResNet20. We then find their difference with
estimated population statistics (µˆP and σˆ2P ). The difference
is shown in Figure 2 where x-axis represents channels and
the y-axis represents the difference for validation batches.
The figure shows that estimated population statistics do not
align with batch statistics under adversarial attack. Simi-
larly, all the channels that are inaccurate in some batches
also tend to make a similar mistake for other batches as
well. Please note that the difference for one channel across
batches is varying although the trend of the error is similar.
The value of the difference varies for different attacks as
well.
Recent work (Ding et al., 2019; Jacobsen et al., 2019) has
also shed light on the link of the shift in the distribution of
input data and robustness. Similarly, this observation has
also been used to augment adversarial examples to get SOTA
results (Xie et al., 2019a). Based on these observations, we
made the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis. BatchNorm’s population statistics (µˆP and
σˆP ) are estimated from Pclean(x, y) and an implicit as-
sumption is that inference images will also come from same
distribution. However, the addition of adversarial noise δ
in clean images shifts this distribution to Padv(x, y). This
breaks the assumption and hence population statistics be-
come inaccurate. The use of these incorrect statistics makes
a neural network with BatchNorm more vulnerable to ad-
versarial inputs.
Stat. Normal FGSM BIM MIM CW PGD
MNIST ( = 0.2, c = 10)
P 99.2 59.6 7.7 16.7 6.9 07.7
B 99.1 91.7 69.3 78.7 46.2 69.3
F-MNIST ( = 0.06, c = 10)
P 93.7 41.7 1.5 2.8 02.2 1.5
B 93.6 73.8 32.4 41.5 25.8 32.3
CIFAR10 ( = 0.02, c = 0.01)
P 92.1 48.3 23.1 27.0 23.7 23.1
B 87.2 67.3 46.7 54.3 40.7 46.6
CIFAR100 ( = 0.02, c = 0.01)
P 68.9 20.2 07.3 08.5 08.8 07.3
B 58.7 31.3 18.6 22.1 29.0 18.5
ImageNet ( = 0.008, c = 0.01)
P 62.7 12.5 4.0 5.2 3.4 4.4
B 63.5 29.2 18.0 21.4 21.0 19.0
Table 1. The effect of using batch statistics (B) vs estimated pop-
ulation statistics (P) on adversarial accuracy. Batch statistics are
calculated from one batch of images (batch to be classified) from
the validation set and estimated population statistics are estimated
during training. The results are shown for five different datasets
and five different attacks. We have used ResNet18 for Imagenet
and ResNet20 for all other datasets. This table proves our hypothe-
sis by showing an increase in accuracy if we use batch statistics
that more representative of an adversarial shift in distribution.
According to our hypothesis, statistics calculated during
training become inaccurate after an adversarial shift in the
input distribution. Hence, one way to prove our hypothesis
is to use adversarially perturbed validation batch to calculate
these statistics and use them instead of train-time estimated
statistics. Note, we only calculated mean and variance based
on the input batch and no retraining of any parameter is in-
volved. We show this for five different datasets and five
different adversarial attacks in Table 1. The clean accuracy
decreases when we use BatchNorm with batch statistics (cal-
culated from clean batch) so we expect a similar decrease in
adversarial accuracy, But it instead increases. For instance,
on MNIST, we get 7% BIM adversarial accuracy with popu-
lation statistics but replacing them with batch statistics from
the validation set increase this to 69%. A similar effect
is also visible across all the attacks, datasets and training
modes. To make our point more rigorous, we also have done
experiments on different architectures with CIFAR10. The
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results are shown in Table 2. A similar increase in adver-
sarial accuracy is also visible for all of these attacks. Note,
for VGG, the improvement is less than ResNet. This can
have two possible explanations: VGG was designed before
BatchNorm and the number of parameters in it is higher
than ResNet models (models with more parameters show
better adversarial accuracy (Madry et al., 2017)).
Model Stat. Normal FGSM BIM MIM CW PGD
ResNet38 P 93.11 53.62 25.51 29.51 27.5 25.52B 89.83 74.27 52.51 60.72 43.67 52.48
ResNet50 P 93.61 55.97 29.07 33.45 29.45 29.07B 89.09 72.32 55.06 61.61 43.96 55.05
VGG11 P 91.66 70.21 63.61 64.71 57.88 63.61B 89.31 81.3 73.44 76.79 67.23 73.44
VGG16 P 93.56 65.58 53.68 56.28 48.73 53.68B 91.36 81.13 57.58 66.32 63.1 57.58
Table 2. Table shows effect of using population vs batch statis-
tics on adversarial accuracy for several models on CIFAR10 and
Imagenet. The column Stat. shows type of statistics used for Batch-
Norm, P stands for Population Statistics (µˆP , σˆ2P ) and B stands
for Batch Statistics calculated from validation batch at inference
(µB and σ2B).
Based on different intuitions and insights, many alternatives
of BatchNorm have been introduced. Some of these vari-
ants do not require estimation of population statistics e.g.
layer normalization (Ba et al., 2016), Fixup Initialization
(Huang et al., 2019) etc. Our hypothesis suggests that the
adversarial accuracy of these variants should be higher than
BatchNorm. We show results for four different alternatives
in Table 3. Note that the clean accuracy of these alternatives
is less than BatchNorm so we expect a similar drop in ad-
versarial accuracy. On the contrary, there is an increment of
adversarial accuracy, proving our hypothesis.
Norm Normal FGSM BIM MIM CW PGD
No Norm 82.9 43.4 29.0 31.5 28.5 29.0
Fixup Init. 91.4 55.7 37.1 41.1 17.9 39.0
LayerNorm 89.4 50.8 30.1 33.4 31.1 30.1
BatchNorm 92.1 48.4 23.1 27.0 23.7 23.8
Table 3. Effects of replacing BatchNorm with alternatives that do
not require any moving average therefore immune to adversarial
shift. Although all of these alternatives have inferior clean accu-
racy; they always outperform BatchNorm in adversarial accuracy.
Adversarial training leverages adversarially perturbed ex-
amples to train a neural network. An adversarially trained
BatchNorm layer estimates population statistics with both
clean and adversarial examples. Therefore, we should ex-
pect better adversarial accuracy which has already been
shown (Madry et al., 2017). We should also expect a smaller
gap between using population statistics and input batch
statistics. This indeed is true and adversarial training bridges
the gap between population statistics and batch statistics
based BatchNorm as shown in Table 4. For instance, on
the CIFAR10 dataset, the gap between BatchNorm with
batch statistics and population statistics is 100% for regu-
lar training but it shrinks to 30% for adversarial training.
This shows the importance of the reliability of train-time
estimated population statistics and their effect on the adver-
sarial performance of a neural network.
Training FGSM BIM MIM CW PGD
CIFAR10
Normal 39.3 102.2 101.1 71.7 101.7
Adversarial 23.0 30.5 31.7 57.3 30.5
CIFAR100
Normal 55.0 154.8 160.0 229.5 153.4
Adversarial 28.6 38.1 38.5 150.0 38.1
Table 4. Percentage adversarial accuracy gain when we use batch
statistics instead of train-time estimated population statistics. Re-
sults are shown for training with clean images (normal training)
and training with both clean and adversarially perturbed images
(adversarial training). As expected, adversarial training shrinks the
gap.
5. Robust Normalization
In the previous section, we observed how train-time esti-
mated population statistics in BatchNorm makes a network
more vulnerable to targeted distribution shift. A straight-
forward solution - as shown in the experiments (Table 1)
- is to use batch statistics calculated from inference input.
However, as noted by (Ioffe, 2017), activations are normal-
ized by statistics estimated from large batch during training
and therefore it introduces intra-batch dependency. This
makes BatchNorm dependent on moving average estimates
for inference. In the experiments of the last section, we
have used a batch size of 128 (same as training batch size).
However, if we use small inference batch size to calculate
statistics, BatchNorm performance descends to zero (see
Figure 4).
From recent work on understanding BatchNorm (Bjorck
et al., 2018; Santurkar et al., 2018), we know that reduction
of internal covariant shift (stability of distributions during
training) is not as substantial as it was considered initially.
These works highlighted the role of BatchNorm in control-
ling exploding activations (Santurkar et al., 2018). This
leads us to the following question: can we control acti-
vations without variables that may require an estimate of
population statistics?
We can use different data normalizations to control the acti-
vations such as normalizing with `p norm of the activation,
rescaling between 0-1 by min-max normalization, etc. Re-
cent work on robustness has shown a connection between
the removal of outliers in activations and robustness (Xie
et al., 2019b; Etmann et al., 2019). This makes min-max
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Figure 3. Comparison of accuracy of the model with different nor-
malization (RN: RobustNorm, BN: BatchNorm) for with ResNet20.
In the presence of adversarial attacks, RobustNorm performs better
than BatchNorm.
normalization an ideal candidate since it rescales input (con-
trolling exploding activations), only requires maximum and
minimum values which are not dependent on the distribution
(no estimates required) and can remove outliers (adversarial
noise). We keep using mean considering the importance of
centering the data (Salimans & Kingma, 2016). We define
the naive version of our RobustNorm as:
yi =
xi − µB
rB
(5)
where xi is i-th example of batch B, range is rB = uB −
lB, maximum is uB = max
1≤i≤M
(xi) and minimum is lB =
min
1≤i≤M
(xi).
From von Szokefalvi Nagy inequality (r2B ≤ 2nσ2B, where
n is number of samples to estimate range), we can say
that range supresses activations with higher intensity than
the variance. BatchNorm uses linear transform to project
activations to an appropriate range. However, in our case,
range makes it harder to learn this projection in the start of
learning. To make the control more flexible, we introduced
a new hyper-parameter – norm power (p). Finally, we define
Robust Normalization (RobustNorm or RN) as follows:
yi =
xi − µB
rpB
. (6)
We only fine tune this p for better convergence and gen-
erlizability across datasets (for details, see Section 6.2).
We evuluated robustness of RobustNorm for three different
datasets. RobustNorm’s accuracy is higher in the presence
of adversarial attacks (Figure 3). Specifically, RobustNorm
increases adversarial accuracy of ResNet20 from 22% to
70% for CIFAR10. All the results are shown in Figure 3.
RobustNorm performs better compared to BatchNorm when
we only use inference inputs to calculate statistics as shown
in Figure 4. But, it still suffers some loss of accuracy. Since
mean (µ) is a distribution statistics, we use its estimate cal-
culated during training. This improved the performance of
RobustNorm for small batch size is shown in Figure 4. To
Figure 4. Comparison of BatchNorm(BN) and RobustNorm(RN)
for small inference batch sizes. RobustNorm performs much better
when we only use inference input to compute statistics but it still
suffers some loss of accuracy. We achieve performance gain by
using estimated value of population mean.
understand the effect of µˆP on adversarial accuracy of Ro-
bustNorm, we perform experiments with varying values of .
As shown in Figure 7, adversarial accuracy of RobustNorm
with µˆP is comparable to RobustNorm while also having
consistent small inference batch performance.
6. Ablation Studies
In this section, we have validated and explored different
properties of RobustNorm.
6.1. Experimental Setup
We have used two network architectures, ResNet (He et al.,
2016) with 20,38 and 50 layers and VGG (Simonyan &
Zisserman, 2014) with 11 and 16 layers. We choose ResNet
and VGG because they represent two diverse families of
architectures, and can be considered as a baseline of many
of the networks commonly used in deep learning. In ResNet
family, we have DenseNet (Huang et al., 2017), WideRes-
Net (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016), ResNext (Xie et al.,
2017), ResNet with Stochastic depth (Huang et al., 2016)
etc., and VGG can be related to LeNet (LeCun et al., 1998),
AlexNet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) etc. We choose to use
ResNet20 as our baseline architecture along with the CI-
FAR10 dataset because of the ease of training and quick ex-
perimentation with limited available compute power. How-
ever, we also presented results on all of the other networks
and datasets to show our point more rigorously whenever
possible. We have also used five different datasets: MNIST
(LeCun & Cortes, 2010), Fashion-MNIST (Xiao et al.,
2017), CIFAR10, CIFAR100 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) and
Imagenet (Deng et al., 2009). We have always used a learn-
ing rate of 0.1 except for no normalization scenarios where
convergence is not possible with higher learning rates. In
such cases, we have used a learning rate of 0.01. We de-
crease the learning rate 10 times at 80th and 120th epoch for
CIFAR10, 100; at 30th epoch for MNIST, Fashion-MNIST;
and at 30th, 60th and 90th epoch for Imagenet. We trained
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Figure 5. Training curves on CIFAR10 dataset for RobustNorm.
We compare loss (left) and acuracy (right) of RobustNorm with
different hyperparameter power (p) values. Note that p = 0.2 (red
line) converges faster than other.
Figure 6. Effect of hyperparameter p on adversaril robustness. The
results are shwon for CIFAR10 and ResNet20. This shows room
for improvement by tuning it.
CIFAR10, 100 for 164 epochs, MNIST, Fashion-MNIST for
50 epochs and ImageNet for 100 epochs. We used (Madry
et al., 2017)’s standard settings for adversarial training. We
have tried to stick with standard training procedures as much
as possible. For all the attacks where distance measure is
required, we use `inf -norm as it is more difficult to evade.
6.2. Analysis of Power Hyperparameter
The RobustNorm introduces a new hyperparameter called
power or p of the range rB. We found p = 0.2 having
faster convergence (see Figure (5), red shows p = 0.2)
and generality across datasets. Therefore, we have used
it for all our experiments. Later, we observed that faster
convergence does not necessarily mean better adversarial
robustness (see Figure 6). For instance, RobustNorm with
p = 0.2 performs worse in terms of adversarial accuracy
when compared to other values. Similarly, p = 0.05 has
better adversarial robustness in RobustNorm with using
population mean. This shows room for more improvement
by tuning this hyperparameter.
6.3. Effect of Adversarial Attack Budget 
Another important aspect of the robustness of a network is
how it responds to the increasing value of adversarial noise
(). To understand it, we evaluated RobustNorm and Robust-
Figure 7. Effect of increasing  for different normalizations. We
compare adversarial accuracy in the presence of FGSM (upper left),
BIM (upper right), MIM (lower left) and PGD (lower right) for
RobustNorm and BatchNorm. BN: BatchNorm, RN: RobustNorm
and RN w/ µˆP : RobustNorm with the population mean. Robust-
Norm consistently performs well in the presence of increasing
adversarial noise.
Norm with the estimated population mean for an increas-
ing value of p. RobustNorm performs significantly better
compared to BatchNorm. For instance, the performance of
ResNet20 with BatchNorm sinks to zero for  > 0.05 for
BIM or PGD attack. RobustNorm, on the other hand, is
more resilient to even higher  and consistently performs
better compared to BatchNorm. RobustNorm with the pop-
ulation mean perform better than BatchNorm although we
lose some adversarial performance gain compare to Robust-
Norm.
6.4. Scalibility to Different Architectures
We also evaluate RobustNorm to show its scalability on dif-
ferent neural network architectures and depths. We choose
ResNet and VGG architectures as a wide variety of neural
networks evolved from these networks. Similarly, VGG was
designed before BatchNorm so it is also interesting to see
its performance under different normalizations. To show the
scalability of RobustNorm for different depths, we choose
two commonly used depths of ResNet (38 and 50) and VGG
(11 and 16). Results for the experiments on these archi-
tectures for CIFAR10 are shown in Table 5. RobustNorm
outperforms BatchNorm by wide margins in all of these
networks. For instance, RobustNorm has a margin of 50%
with ResNet38, 31% for ResNet50, 15% for VGG11 and
28% for VGG16 when the input has BIM adversarial noise.
Similar trends are also visible under different attacks.
6.5. RobustNorm for ImageNet
It is well known that adversarial defense methods are diffi-
cult to scale on large datasets such as ImageNet (Kurakin
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Model Norm FGSM BIM MIM CW PGD
ResNet38
BN 49.10 18.77 23.90 12.74 20.80
RN 78.71 71.19 72.74 29.17 72.28
RN w/ µˆP 80.29 71.13 73.23 31.02 72.46
ResNet50
BN 51.14 24.31 29.20 12.53 26.29
RN 76.58 65.97 68.82 32.19 67.53
RN w/ µˆP 80.10 71.02 72.64 35.76 72.07
VGG11
BN 69.44 61.83 63.70 42.88 62.79
RN 82.03 77.76 78.94 61.57 78.24
RN w/ µˆP 82.05 76.11 77.88 59.47 76.95
VGG16
BN 63.60 50.15 53.53 30.13 51.52
RN 83.56 78.75 80.12 50.10 79.28
RN w/ µˆP 82.74 74.73 76.99 49.57 75.81
Table 5. Scalibility of RobustNorm across different architectures
and depths. BN: BatchNorm, RN: RobustNorm and RN w/ µˆP :
RobustNorm with the population mean. Note consistent perfor-
mance of RobustNorm across architectures and depths.
et al., 2016). To test the effectiveness of RobustNorm at
scale, we performed experiments for RobustNorm on Im-
ageNet. Results are shown in Table 6. RobustNorm beats
BatchNorm for all the attacks by a wide margin. Note that
we have not used any fine-tuning for hyper-parameter p due
to limited compute power available.
Norm Normal FGSM BIM MIM CW PGD
BN 62.9 12.5 4.0 5.2 3.4 4.4
RN 61.6 28.5 19.8 21.9 22.8 20.5
RN w/ µˆP 61.8 28.1 17.7 20.1 25.3 18.7
Table 6. Comparison of RobustNorm (RN) and BatchNorm (BN)
for ImageNet. We have used ResNet18 and  = 0.008. Robust-
Norm perform better than BatchNorm for all the attacks.
7. Limitations and Future Work
We believe that several factors can help fully understand
the role of BatchNorm in the adversarial vulnerability of
a network such as the effect of intra-batch dependency of
BatchNorm on adversarial behavior as well its poor perfor-
mance for small batches. Similarly, input image at inference
time is not used to “correct” population statistics. As a bet-
ter estimate of statistics is essential, this correction can help
make the neural network more robust. Another exciting
direction is to see the generalizability of RobustNorm to
Layer, Group, and InstanceNorm. Since these norms do not
require an estimate of population statistics, RobustNorm
can work better.
8. Conclusion
We have investigated how BatchNorm makes a network
more vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We observed that
BatchNorm estimates population statistics from clean im-
ages during training and the addition of adversarial noise
introduces a targeted distribution shift in the input. We hy-
pothesized that this shift makes train-time estimated statis-
tics inaccurate thereby causing the adversarial vulnerability.
We showed our hypothesis by showing adversarial accuracy
differences between statistics calculated form input batch
and train-time estimated statistics. The results on multiple
datasets and architectures proved our hypothesis. We also
showed that normalizations that do not require these train-
time estimated values perform better compare to BatchNorm.
Afterward, based on these insights and intuitions from pre-
vious work understanding of BatchNorm, we proposed a
new normalization called RobustNorm. RobustNorm offers
a promise of improving the robustness of any model with
BatchNorm while having other benefits. We demonstrate
this on ResNet and VGG for different depths.
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